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and the proper role of courts in a constitutional system. He also perceives a significant risk
that an internationalist approach to constitutional adjudication could result in undermining
rather than enhancing the American approach to constitutional rights. MichaelD. Ramsey con-
tinues the critique by calling for those who would apply international sources to accept rigor-
ous discipline in their use, involving (1) articulation of the theory of relevance of such mate-
rials; (2) acceptance of outcomes that might not necessarily support the rights-enhancing
preferences of most internationalists; (3) attention to the full factual picture of international
practice; and (4) avoidance of the uncritical assumption that the views of selected human
rights tribunals and UN agencies represent a global consensus.
Gerald L. Neuman offers both ajustification for turning to international law and practice
as one available resource for constitutional interpretation, and a method for how to do so.
He analyzes the relationship between international human fights law and constitutional inter-
pretation in terms of their consensual, suprapositive, and institutional characteristics, so that
a serious inquiry into international sources can inform a domestic court as it strives for the
most complete understanding of complex problems that recur in democratic societies around
the world. Finally, T. Alexander Aleinikoff seeks to move beyond the existing debates on the
place of international law in theU.S. legal system, by advocating congressional enactment of
a new "Incompatibility Statute" modeled on the British Human Rights Act, which would allow
forjudicial determinations of inconsistencies between U.S. federal law and international law
and facilitate efforts to ensure compliance with the international obligations of the United
States.
Our hope is that the viewpoints expressed in this forum not only will contribute to the ongo-
ing dialogue in this country about the relevance of international sources to domestic legal
questions, but also will help our foreign readership reach a fuller understanding of the com-
plex interactions of international law and constitutional law in the United States.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF OUR LAW
By Harold Hongu Koh*
What did the United States Supreme Court mean when it famously said, "International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of
appropriatejurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination"?' Perhaps the Courtwas suggesting that, in an interdependent world,
* Of the Board of Editors. The author served as Counsel of Record for Mary Robinson, et al., Amici Curiae, in
Lawrence v. Texas (arguing that statutes criminalizing same-sex sodomy violate the concept of"ordered liberty" in
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses), and for U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz, et al., Amici Curiae, in
McCarverv. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (U.S. cert. dismissed Sept. 25, 2001), and in Atkins v. Virginia (arguing that
execution of those with mental retardation violates Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause).
Special thanks to Gerald Neuman, for his insight; to Kenji Yoshino, Ryan Goodman, Robert Wintemute, and an
extraordinary group of Yale Law students who worked with me on those amicus briefs; and to Allon Kedem for
his fine research assistance.
' The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Five years earlier, in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895),Justice
Gray explained in more detail:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only questions of right
between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions arising
under what is usually called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of per-
sons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the
dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and must he ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their
determination.
Id. at 163.
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United States courts should not decide cases without paying "a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind," in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence. The framers
and earlyJustices understood that the global legitimacy of a fledgling nation crucially depended
upon the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the international system within
which it sought acceptance.3 Their recognition seems both prudent and sensible. Even today,
for any nation consciously to ignore global standards not only would ensure constant frictions
with the rest of the world, but also would diminish that nation's ability to invoke those inter-
national rules that served its own national purposes.4
Not surprisingly, the early Supreme Court saw thejudicial branch as a central channel for
making international law part of U.S. law.5 The original design and early practice of our courts
envisioned that they would not merely accept, but would actively pursue, an understanding
and incorporation of international law standards out of a decent respect for the opinions of
mankind. When "there is no written law upon the subject,"Justice Horace Gray directed, "the
duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it
becomes necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought
before them."6 By so saying, he echoed ChiefJustice John Marshall's memorable cadence in
Marbury v. Madison: "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of thejudicial department
to say what the law is,"' a directive that nowhere limited thejudiciary's law-declaring function
to cases involving domestic law.
Thus, many of Marshall's early opinions expressly promoted the implicit or explicit inter-
nalization of international law into U.S. domestic law: through statutory construction, direct
invocation, and even constitutional interpretation. Within a year after writing Marbury, for
example, Chief'Justice Marshall ruled in The CharmingBetsy that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."8
2 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("When in the Course of human Events, it becomes
necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bonds which have connected them with one another,... a decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.")
(emphasis added).
'The author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, heralded the law of nations as "an integral part... of the
laws of the land." Letter from ThomasJefferson, Secretary of State, to M. Genet, French Minister (June 5, 1793),
quoted in IJOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONALLAW 10 (1906). InJohnJay's words, "the United States
had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of nations." Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); seeWare v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson,J.) ("When the
United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of
purity and refinement."); see also I Op. Att'y Gen. 26 (1792) (opinion of Attorney General Randolph) ("The law
of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution, or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law
of the land.").
4 Witness, for example, the first acts of East Timor's newly elected eighty-eight-member Parliament: signing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and applying to join the United Nations. East Timor Becomes 191st U.N.
Member Today, NY. TIMES, Sept. 27,2002, at Al. See also President Xanana Gusm5.o, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly on East Timor's New Membership, UN Doc. A/57/P.V.20, at 10, 11-12 (2002), stating:
We are aware that we will be serving the interests of our people only if we honour our international commit-
ments by signing the relevant conventions and treaties which not only safeguard our sovereignty and our inter-
ests but also respect the sovereignty and interests of other peoples and States, particularly those of our region.
5
SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 111 introductory note (1987)
("From the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated
into the law of the United States without the need for any action by Congress or the President, and the courts, State
and federal, have applied it and given it effect as the courts of England had done.") (emphasis added); Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Centusy of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853,868
(1987) ("[Ejarly United States courts and legislators regarded customary international law and treaty obligations
as part of the domestic legal system. International law was domestic law.") (emphasis in original). For a fuller dis-
cussion of the judicial branch as a channel of internalization of international norms into U.S. law, see generally
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
'Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
35 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
sMurray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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Eleven years later, he clarified that absent a contrary statute, "the Court is bound by the law
of nations which is a part of the law of the land."' In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice
Marshall suggested that mankind's views are also relevant to the task of constitutional inter-
pretation, noting:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would
be this--that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action....
... In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.")
Significantly, at the beginning of the Republic, U.S. courts drew no sharp line between
international and foreign law, precisely because of the extensive overlap of these two bodies
of law. Customary rules like lex mercatoria and the criminal prohibition against piracies and
felonies on the high seas were both "international," in the sense of governing transboundary
transactions, and "foreign," in the sense of being internalized into the domestic law of for-
eign legal systems, as well as that of the United States." It was thus often difficult to distinguish
when American courts were treating "international" or "foreign" law as part of our law. Some
rules were inherently "transnational," hence not easily categorized as local or global in nature.
From the beginning, then, American courts regularly tookjudicial notice of both interna-
tional law and foreign law (the law and practice of other nations) when construing American
law. Given this historical tradition, should United States constitutional interpretation now
ignore international law standards and the practices of other countries? Remarkably, some offer
reasons why it should. 2 But such an approach would constitute a stunning reversal of history.
When is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to construe our Constitution in light of for-
eign and international law? History suggests that over the years, the Court has regularly looked
to foreign and international precedents as an aid to constitutional interpretation in at least
three situations, which for simplicity's sake I will call "parallel rules," "empirical light," and
"community standard." First, the Court has noted when American legal rules seem to paral-
lel those of other nations, particularly those with similar legal and social traditions." As the
Court has repeatedly recognized, the concept of "ordered liberty" is not uniquely American
but, rather, is "enshrined" in the legal history of "English-speaking peoples," as well as other
legal systems. 4
'The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); see also The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812) (declaring international rule of absolute foreign sovereign immunity as U.S. law).
'0 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-07 (1819) (emphasis added).
" SeeHarold Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law oflnternational Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 221,224-29 (1978) (law merchant was transnational private law based not on anysingle national law but
on mercantile customs generally accepted by trading nations); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States (pt. 1), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 26-27 (1952).
'2 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AJIL 57 (2004) [hereinafter
Alford, Misusing Sources]; Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43
VA.J. INT'L L. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Alford, Federal Courts]; Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AJIL 69 (2004).
"See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 (1878) (pointing out that" [plolygamy has always been odious
among the northern and western nations of Europe").
4 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,673 n.42 (1977) (quoting Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949)); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,488 n.59,521-22 (1966) (quoting from a 1954 decision by the lordjustice
general of India and citing the experiences in other countries); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,548 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (delimiting the notion of privacy in the home by looking to "common understanding throughout
the English-speaking world"); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,167 (1955) (finding a practice "supported by
long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)
(writing that the Due Process Clause obliges courts to ascertain whether a given law or practice offends "those canons
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Second, asJustice Stephen Breyer recently noted, the "Court has long considered as relevant
and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable
to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances."' 5 In Printz v. United
States, he elaborated:
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and
there may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our
own.... But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the problem of reconciling
central authority with the need topreserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller
constituent governmental entity.'
Third, in addition to situations involving parallel rules and empirical lessons, the Court
has looked outside the United States when a U.S. constitutional concept, by its own terms,
implicitly refers to a community standard-e.g., "cruel and unusual" "dueprocess of law," "unrea-
sonablesearches and seizures." In such cases, the Court has long since recognized that the rele-
vant communities to be consulted include those outside our shores. For example, in deciding
whether a particular punishment has become both "cruel and unusual," the Court has long
taken notice of foreign and international practice to evaluate how "unusual" the practice has
become.' 7 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court specifically held that the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution contains "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." 8 In Tropand subsequent cases, the Court made clear that this "evolv-
ing standard" should be measured by reference notjust to maturing American experience,
but to foreign and international experience as well.
In Coker v. Georgia,'" for example, the Court determined that international practices regard-
ing the death penalty for rape were relevant to its "evolving standards" analysis. Five years
later, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court noted that "the doctrine of felony murder has been abol-
ished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Common-
wealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe."' In Thompson v. Oklahoma,2' follow-
ing the reasoning of Trop,JusticeJohn Paul Stevens's plurality opinion invalidated the death
penalty for fifteen-year-old offenders, evaluating the Eighth Amendment's "civilized stan-
dards of decency" in part by looking to the prohibition of the execution of minors by the
Soviet Union and nations of Western Europe.22 In addition, both the plurality and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence found significant that three major international human
of decency and fairness which express the notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples"); Rast v. Van Deman &
Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (observing that the Constitution embodies "only relatively fundamental rules
of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities"). Happily, over time, the Court has relaxed
its "Anglophonia" and spoken more broadly about "civilized societies," without regard to the particular language
they mayspeak. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409 (1986) (noting"the natural abhorrence civilized societies
feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity") (emphasis added).
" Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
16 521 U.S. 898,921 n.l, 977 (1997) (Breyer,J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17 AsJustice Blackmun noted, "If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the 'evolving standards
of decency' of the civilized world, there can be nojustification for limitingjudicial inquiry to the opinions of the
United States." Harry A. Blackmun, TheSupreme Court and theLaw of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,48 (1994); cf Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (observing that the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punish-
ments embodies broad evolving "concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency") (emphasis added).
For a review of this history, see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty,
35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1085, 1118-27 (2002), from which some of the discussion in the text derives.
is 3 5 6 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
19433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
20 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
2 1 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
'Justice Stevens noted the views of"other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and.., the leading
members of the Western European community." Id. at 829-30, 829 n.30.
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rights treaties-including, in its Article 68, the 1949 Geneva Convention, which the United
States had ratified-explicitly prohibited juvenile death penalties.
21
Thompson's reliance on foreign precedent drew a vigorous dissent from Justice Antonin Scalia,
who denounced the plurality's reliance on international practice as "totally inappropriate."
"[T] he views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think
them to be," he argued, "cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. 24
But given the foregoing historyJustice Scalia erred in at least four ways. First, that history should
have led ajustice devoted to originalism to look, like the framers themselves, toward-not
away from-international opinion. Second, far from "imposing" the views of other nations
on Americans, an originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment would have acknowledged
that the views of other nations were not imposed on earlyAmericans; rather, Americans self-
consciously appealed to those views in order to win global legitimacy for their fledgling republic.
Third, on reflection, it makes little constitutional sense for our Supreme Court to decide these
cases in a vacuum. The United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal system. It
shares a common legal heritage, tradition, and history with many foreign constitutional sys-
tems. For that reason, constitutional concepts like "liberty," "equal protection," "due process
of law," and privacy have never been exclusive U.S. property, but have long carried global
meaning.25 To construe these terms in ignorance of these foreign and international prece-
dents virtually ensures that our Supreme Court rulings will generate conflict and controversies
with our closest global allies. Conversely, to construe these terms in light of foreign interpre-
tations allows the United States to use the experience of other nations that share its common
constitutional genealogy as laboratories to test workable social solutions to common con-
stitutional problems.
26
Fourth and finally, Justice Scalia himself has been far from consistent in insisting upon the
irrelevance of foreign and international law. Depending upon the factual setting, he has not
hesitated to take foreign practice into account or to argue in favor of construing U.S. law
consistently with principles of international law.27 Nevertheless, one year after ThompsonJus-
tice Scalia narrowly carried the day in Stanford v. Kentucky, when a 5-4 majority of the Court
held that, notwithstanding international opinion, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
the execution ofjuvenile offenders who committed their crimes at age sixteen.2 5Justice Scalia's
opinion announcing the Court'sjudgment,joined without comment byJustice O'Connor,
applied the methodology of his Thompson dissent. Refusing to examine thejuvenile sentenc-
ing practices of other countries, he asserted that in determining contemporary standards of
23 Id. at831 n.34; id. at851 (O'ConnorJ., concurringin thejudgment) (citingAmerican Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, Art. 4(5), 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into forceJuly 18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, Art. 6(5),999 UNTS 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPRI; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 68,
6 UST 3516,3560,75 UNTS 287,330 (entered into force Oct. 21,1950)).Justice O'Connor's concurrence invoked
the U.S. ratification of the Geneva Convention "to undercut any assumption that [recent congressional legislation
has intended] to authorize the death penalty for some 15-year-old felons." Id. at 852.
24 Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Cf Malinski v. NewYork, 324 U.S. 401,413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter,J., concurring) (arguing: "The safeguards
of'due process of law' and 'the equal protection of the laws' summarize the history offreedom ofEnglish-speaking
proples running back to Magna Carta and reflected in the constitutional development of our people.").
26 Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting) (noting that states
of the United States can "serve as ... laborator[ies]" for "social and economic experiments").
21 See, e.g., Mclntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (observing that
Australian, Canadian, and English statutes banning anonymous campaign speech suggest that such bans need not
impair democracy); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 820 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (opposing
the assertion of extraterritorialjurisdiction by Congress over antitrust defendants' foreign activity on the ground
that "this and other courts have frequently recognized that... statutes should not be interpreted to regulate for-
eign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international law").
28 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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decency, "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive."2Justice WilliamJ. Brennan,
now dissenting for the four members of the Thompson plurality, countered with a "community
standard" rationale: "objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form
of legislation in other countries [are] also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis....
Within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty forjuvenile crimes appears
to be overwhelmingly disapproved.""0
For more than a decade, a slim Court majority clung to this blinkered view in death penalty
cases. Yet during the same period, nearly every member of the Court wrote orjoined opin-
ions using foreign practice or precedent to illuminate interpretations of the United States
Constitution. 3' Ironically, within months of the Court's pronouncement in Stanford, even Chief
Justice William Rehnquist suggested in extrajudicial writing:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of
judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone
exercised this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts were created after
the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, among other sources, for developing their own law. But now that con-
stitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin
looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.2
Variations on the Chief'Justice's theme have been sounded with increasing vigor byJustices
Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Anthony Kennedy in various speeches and
other extrajudicial statements.33
During the last two Supreme Court Terms, promising signs have emerged that the American
ostrich is finally starting to take its head out of the sand. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court sig-
naled its willingness to cite foreign and international law practice, holding that execution of
Id. at 369 n.I. Although Justice O'Connorjoined part I ofJustice Scalia's Stanford opinion, which included
his dismissive footnote, her concurrence made no mention of it. Instead, her separate opinion explicitly applied the
Thompson standard and concluded that no national consensus yet forbade the imposition of capital punishment
on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders. Id. at 382.
31 Id. at 389-90 & n.9 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Amnesty International brief).
"' See cases cited supra notes 15, 22, 23, 27; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000)
(Breyer,J., concurring) (finding the Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence consistent with decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,828 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring) (examining Dutch constitutional practice on physician-assisted suicide); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
906 n. 14(1994) (ThomasJ., concurring) (mentioningvoting systems ofBelgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand,
West Germany, and Zimbabwe in assessing race consciousness in the American voting system); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (KennedyJ., dissenting) (likening the government's racial classifications in
minority-owned broadcasting enhancement scheme to practices of Nazi Germany and South Africa); United States v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,710 (1987) (O'Connor,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Nuremberg
Military Tribunals in arguing against medical experimentation on humans without their consent).
3 2William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Counts-ComparativeRemarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANYAND ITS BAsic LAw:
PAST, PRESENTAND FUTURE-AGERMAN-AMERICANSM%\POSIUM 411,412 (Paul Kirchhof& Donald P. Kommers eds.,
1993) (emphasis added); seealsoWashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16, 785-87 (1997) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (declaring that "[iln almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a
suicide," noting that "other countries are embroiled in similar debates" concerning physician-assisted suicide, and
citing the Supreme Court of Canada, the British House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, New Zealand's
Parliament, the Australian Senate, and Colombia's Constitutional Court); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,828 (1997)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting European law on legislative standing but declining to find it in our constitutional regime);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,945 n. 1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing abortion decisions by the West German Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court).
S
3
justice Breyer in particular has cogently argued in favor of reviving the use of foreign and international law
precedent to inform U.S. constitutional interpretation in all three kinds of cases: those involving parallel rules,
empirical lessons, and an evolving community standard. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 ASIL PROC.
265 (2003); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture (Feb. 11, 1999), in2l CARDOZO L. REv. 253,282 (1999); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 ASIL PROC. 348,350 (2002) (stating that "[a]lthough international law and the law
of other nations are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and
by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts," and that "there
is much to learn from other distinguishedjurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues thatwe face here").
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persons with mental retardation would offend civilized standards of decency, in part because
"within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."3 4 Only a few months later, in
Patterson v. TexasJustices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from denial of certiorari in
a case challenging Texas's execution of ajuvenile offender, noting that "the issue has been the
subject of further debate and discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations,"
which had produced an "apparent consensus ... among the States and in the international
community against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on ajuvenile offender."35 Sim-
ilarly, when the petitioner in the 1989 Stanford case-still on death row after twenty years-
petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of habeas corpus, citing Atkins, Justices
Stevens, David Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all dissented from the Court's denial of the peti-
tion." On the same day,Justice Breyer separately dissented from a denial of certiorari, argu-
ing that Atkins's consideration of foreign law required reexamination ofwhether prolonged
incarceration on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment per se.37
Writing soon thereafter, one commentator tried to dismiss this trend, noting that "Atkins
presented the Supreme Court with an invitation to begin the process of internalizing global
norms against the death penalty, and give 'new energy to "vertical" efforts to internalize
international law norms into domestic constitutional law.' But the Supreme Court declined
the invitation."' But no one could say the same after this past year's Supreme Court Term, when
the relevance of foreign and international law to constitutional interpretation arose during
the Term's two most publicized cases. During oral argument in the Michigan affirmative action
cases, Justice Ginsburg asked the solicitor general:
[W] e're part of a world, and this problem is a global problem. Other countries operating
under the same equality norm have confronted it. Our neighbor to the north, Canada,
has, the European Union, South Africa, and they have all approved this kind of, they call
it positive discrimination.... [T] hey have rejected what you recited as the ills that follow
from this. Should we shut that from our view at all or should we consider whatjudges
in other places have said on this subject?39
Several months laterJustice Ginsburg answered her own question in a concurring opinion
that invoked a view she had expressed in her extrajudicial writings."0 Writing in Grutter v.
Bollinger, Justice Ginsburg,joined byJustice Breyer, pointed out, "[t] he Court's observation
that race-conscious programs 'must have a logical end point,' accords with the international
understanding of the office of affirmative action," citing the text of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was ratified by the United
States in 1994.4"
" Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens,J.). Even this modest truism evoked remarkably harsh
rejoinders from the dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, who again insisted that "the viewpoints
of other countries simply are not relevant" to an assessment of U.S. constitutional standards. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting).
s Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
. In re Stanford, 123 S.Ct. 472,472-73 (2002) (Stevens,J., dissenting). InJune 2003, the governor of Kentucky
announced that he would commute Stanford's death sentence. At that point, Stanford had been on death row for two
decades for a crime he had committed when he was seventeen. SeeAndrew Wolfson, Patton Pardons 4 in Election Case and
Will Commute Death Sentence; Stanford's Family Celebrates; Victim's Sister Is Repulsed, CoURIER-J.,June 19, 2003, at LA.
s Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 471-72 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 782.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), available in 2003
U.S. TRANS LEXIS 27.
40 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg,J., concurring), with Ginsburg & Merritt, supra
note 33, at 282 ("In my view, comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions
and enforcing human rights. We are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate
bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups.").
"' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (citation omitted).
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just three days later, in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas,4" the Supreme Court struck
down a Texas law banning consensual sodomy between adults of the same sex. Remarkably,
the Court did not simply overrule its infamous seventeen-year-old decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick;43 it announced that Bowers had been wrong when decided." Significantly, the Supreme
Court had decided Bowers without even mentioning Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, issued five years
earlier by the European Court of Human Rights, which had rejected same-sex sodomy prohi-
bitions as a violation of the European Convention's right to privacy.45 Dudgeon was never
acknowledged by, distinguished by, or even properly cited to the Bowers Court.46 Since Bowers,
the European Court of Human Rights had reaffirmed the Dudgeon decision not once, but twice:
in 1988 in Norris v. Ireland, and five years later in Modinos v. Cyprus.
47
Writing for the Court in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy took note of this parallel precedent,
declaring:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be
noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom .... Modinos v. Cyprus,... [and] Norris v. Ireland.... Other nations, too,
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. See Brief for Mary Robinson, et al. as
Amici Curiae 11-12.The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an inte-
gral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that
in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent.4"
Despite nearly a half century of coexistence between the United States Supreme Court
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Lawrence was the first U.S. Supreme Court
majority opinion ever to cite an ECHRjudgment in the text of its opinion. Moreover, as
Gerald Neuman has noted, the pages cited byJustice Kennedy in the Mary Robinson amicus
brief to support the proposition that "[o] ther nations... have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct" describe how in 1994 the Australian Parliament had exercised its constitutional
power to implement the United Nations Human Rights Committee's interpretation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to override a contrary Tasmanian law.49
Some therefore suggest that Lawrence marks a striking departure in U.S. constitutional inter-
pretation. But what this ignores is that, in fact, both the U.S. Supreme Court dissent50 and the
" 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
4'478 U.S. 186 (1986).
"' 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
45 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 41 (1981). The Court found the asserted state interests insufficient tojustify the
"detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislative provisions in question can have on the life of a person
of homosexual orientation." Id., para. 60.
" The only brief in Bowers to cite European precedent had cited the European Commission of Human Rights
report and pleadings in Dudgeon, but never cited or referred to the Court's judgment. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at 15 nn.10, 24, Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 01-102).
Thus, as Lord Lester of Herne Hill has noted, although Bowers turned on a single vote, "[ n jo one drew the [U.S.]
Supreme Court's attention to the importance of Dudgeon as a recent decision by the strongest international court
of human rights, dealing with a closely analogous problem, and having potential persuasive value." Anthony Lester,
The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 560 (1988); see also Richard B. Lillich, The
Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AJIL 851 (1989).
4' Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
4 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.
45Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 98 AJIL 82,89-90 & n.40 (2004)
(noting Human Rights Committee's interpretation in Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994)).5°Justice Scalia's dissent looked to Canadian law to invoke the specter of "judicial imposition of homosexual
marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada." Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2497 (citing Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL
34950 (Ont. Ct. App.June 10, 2003)).
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lower court in Lawrence had also invoked foreign comparisons. The Supreme Court simply
used foreign legal evidence to challenge assumptions that the lower court had accepted
without analysis. For example, to justify its ruling upholding the Texas sodomy statute, the
Texas Court of Appeals had cited ancient Roman law, Blackstone, and Montesquieu to sup-
port the claim that "Western civilization has a long history of repressing homosexual behav-
ior by state action.""' Yet incredibly, in making that assertion, the court took no notice of any
judicial decision from any modern Western civilization, when all of Europe, for example, had
for more than two decades taken the opposite view. Similarly, in Bowers, Chief Justice Warren
Burger had claimed in concurrence that "[t] o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is some-
how protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching, ""
oblivious to the fact that, six years earlier, the European Court had already cast that teaching
aside for what are now more than 800 million citizens of forty-five member states of the Coun-
cil of Europe!
After Grutterand Lawrence, what can now be said about the role of foreign and international
law in U.S. constitutional interpretation? One obvious question is whether and how extensively
the Court will apply its method in Lawrence to other constitutional contexts, particularly the
death penalty. Only weeks after Lawrence was decided, one federal district judge cited it,
together with Atkins, to question whether the federal death penalty can be reconciled with the
constitutional barrier against executing persons who are actually innocent.5" In particular,
the Lawrence approach clearly now runs on a collision course with America's continuing pen-
chant for executingjuvenile offenders.
In 1979 representatives of the U.S. Department of State represented to Congress thatjuve-
nile execution was no longer a practice engaged in by the United States.54 But a year after
invalidating capital punishment for fifteen-year-olds in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court in
Stanford v. Kentuckyarbitrarily concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the
execution of sixteen-year-old juvenile offenders. When the rest of the nations of the world
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child-which only the United States and Somalia
have declined to do-they committed themselves to banning executions of offenders under
the age of eighteen. It thus became inevitable that the United States would soon stand virtu-
ally alone in openly executing juvenile offenders.
As expected, since 1989 the United States has carried out more publicly reported executions
ofjuvenile offenders than any other country. In 1999 the only country besides the United
States to admit to executing ajuvenile offender was Iran.55 As abolition of the death penalty
has become a cornerstone of European human rights policy, central and eastern European
countries that aspire to enter the European political and economic system have increasingly
calculated that the benefits ofjoining that system far exceed any benefits that might inure
from the occasional use of the death penalty against juveniles.56 Thus, from 1994 to 2003,
Amnesty International recorded twenty executions of child offenders in only five countries: the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, and-the leader, with thirteen-
5' Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (2901).
52 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" United States v. Sampson, Memorandum and Order, CR No. 01-10384-MLW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14050,
at *97 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2003) (observing that the fact that the death penalty has been widely abolished abroad
"is cognizable evidence ofcontemporarystandards of decency"); seeAdam Liptak, Signs Grow of Innocent People Being
Executed,Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A10.
" International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 55 (1979)
(response by the Department of State to the "Critique of Reservations to the International Human Rights Cove-
nants" by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
" Reported Executions of Child Offenders Since 1990, tbl., in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE EXCLUSION OF
CHILD OFFENDERS FROM THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW §5 (AI Index No. ACT 50/004/
2003,2003) [hereinafterAMNESTYREPORT], availableat<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500042003>.
56 As the Death Penalty Information Center has chronicled, steps have recently been taken to abolish or impose
a moratorium on the death penalty in such countries as Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the former Yugoslavia.
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the United States.57 Of these, "[t]he only country that openly continues to execute child
offenders within the framework of its regular criminaijustice system is the USA.""8 Five of the
last seven juvenile offenders executed worldwide have been executed in the United States.9
Even within the United States, executions of child offenders since 1977 have been carried out
in just seven states, over two thirds of them in Texas and Virginia. Given these facts, any
commonsense understanding of a ban against "cruel and unusual punishments" should now
include a practice deemed notjust unusual, but illegal by all but five countries in the world
and all but a few states even in this country. Weighing foreign and international opinion into
any evaluation of evolving standards of decency among civilized nations leads inexorably to
the conclusion that killing child offenders now violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Indeed, that was the conclusion of the Missouri Supreme
Court in Roper v. Simmons, a case that will be heard by the United States Supreme Court early
in the 2004-2005 Term. 60
More fundamentally, the last Supreme Court Term confirms that two distinct approaches
now uncomfortably coexist within our own Supreme Court's globaljurisprudence.6 1 The first
is a "nationalistjurisprudence," exemplified by the opinions ofJustices Scalia and Clarence
Thomas.62 Thatjurisprudence is characterized by commitments to territoriality, extreme def-
erence to national executive power and political institutions, and resistance to comity or inter-
national law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives. This line of cases largely
refuses to look beyond U.S. national interests when assessing the legality of extraterritorial
action. Moreover, these decisions have largely rejected international comity as a reason unilat-
erally to restrain the scope of U.S. regulation, 6 3 and dismiss treaty or customary international
law rules as meaningful restraints upon U.S. action.' To deal with perceived exigencies, these
rulings have broadly deferred to federal executive power, largely unchecked byjudicial over-
sight, "clear statement" principles, or claims of individual rights.65 When advised of foreign
legal precedents, these decisions have treated them as irrelevant, or worse yet, an impermis-
sible imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty.
66
A second, more venerable strand of "transnationalistjurisprudence," now being carried
forward byJustices Breyer and Ginsburg,6 7 began with Chief'Justice (and former congressional
secretary for foreign affairs) John Jay and Chief'Justice (and former secretary of state) Marshall,
57
AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 55.
58 Id. §5.
51 See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003).
' Roper v. Simmons (No. 03-633), cert. granted (U.S.Jan. 26,2004), available at<http://supremecourvus.gov/orders/
courtorders/012604pzr.pdf> (reviewing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411,413 (2003) (finding
"of note that the views of the international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty
forjuveniles" en route to holding that "the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18
years of age violates 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,'" and is thus
barred by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments)).
61 This analysis builds on earlier discussions in Harold Hongju Koh, On AmericanExceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv.
1479, 1513-15 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalBusiness Transactions in United States Courts, 261 RECUEIL
DES COURS 13, 226-34 (1996).
62 Despite his occasional extrajudicial writings, see, e.g., supra note 32, in his Court opinions ChiefJustice Rehnquist
remains firmly in the nationalist camp.
61 See, e.g, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (rejecting international comity as a bar against
the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign reinsurance claims).
6 SeeHarold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigmn"in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391,2413-23
(1994) (collecting cases).
65 See generally HAROLD HoNGU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrY CONmTrurnON: SHARING POWER AFrER THE IRAN-
CONTRAAFFAIR 117-49 (1990) (reviewing cases).
' See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas,J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("[Tihis
Court[] ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.").
"7 Justices Stevens and Souter are also regular members of this camp. Through their extrajudicial statements
and opinions of the past Terms, the two "swingiustices," Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor, have also
increasingly demonstrated transnationalist leanings.
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"who were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by it."68 In later years,
this school was carried forward by Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot and ThePaquete Habana,69 and
by three members of the Supreme Court-Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices David
Brewer and William Day-who helped found the American Society of International Law, along
with William Howard Taft, who later became president, then chiefjustice, of the United States.7°
During the tenure of ChiefJustices Earl Warren and Burger, the transnationalist position was
championed byJustices WilliamJ. Brennan, William 0. Douglas, 7 and-particularly in his
famous Sabbatino dissent-Justice Byron White. 7 And in the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts,
the leading transnationalist role was played byJustice Harry Blackmun.73
Unlike nationalistjurisprudence, which rejects foreign and international precedents and
looks for guidance primarily to national territory, political institutions, and executive power,
the transnationalistj urisprudence assumes America's political and economic interdependence
with other nations operating within the international legal system. Nor, significantly, do these
Justices distinguish sharply between the relevance of foreign and international law, recogniz-
ing that one prominent feature of a globalizing world is the emergence of a transnational
law, particularly in the area of human rights, that merges the national and the international.74
Addressing the American Society of International Law,Justice O'Connor noted that, increas-
ingly, foreign and international law issues are coming before U.S. courts "because interna-
tional law is no longer confined in relevance to a few treaties and business agreements. Rather,
it has taken on the character of transnational law-what PhilipJessup has defined as law that
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers."75 Similarly,Justice Breyer has
noted, time has blurred
the differences between what my law professors used to call comparative law and public
international law.... Formally speaking, state law is state law, but practically speaking,
much of that law is national, if not international, in scope. Analogous developments
internationally, including the emergence of regional or specialized international legal
bodies, tend similarly to produce cross-country results that resemble each other more and more,
exhibiting common, if not universal, principles in a variety of legal areas.
76
In such a transnationalist system, asJustice Breyer has noted, understanding and making
reference to foreign constitutional precedents aids U.S. constitutional interpretation, "simply
because of the enormous value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience
of others."77 Under this view, domestic courts must play a key role in coordinating U.S. do-
mestic constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international law, not simply to promote
American aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international
Blackmun, supra note 17, at 49.
69 See supra note 1.
7' Breyer, supra note 33, at 265.
7' Harold Hongju Koh, The Liberal Constitutional Internationalism ofJustice Douglas, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS
WAYAGAIN": THE LEGACY OFJUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 297 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990).
72 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (White,J., dissenting), discussed in Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2362-63 (1991).
7. See Blackmun, supra note 17, at 49. For elaboration of this theme, see Harold Hongju Koh,Justice Blackmun
and the World Out There, 104 YALE L.J. 23, 28-31 (1994) (collecting cases).
71 Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26YALEJ. INT'LL. 305,306 (2001) (arguing that "as
international legal academics, we must start treating transnational law as its own category. Domestic and interna-
tional will soon become so integrated that we will no longer know whether to characterize certain concepts as local
or global in nature."). See also id. (noting that the metric system, Greenwich Mean Time, and the term "dot.com"
have "[a]ll... become, over time, genuinely transnational concepts in which a global standard has become fully
recognized, integrated, and internalized into the domestic system of nearly every nation of the world").
15 O'Connor, supra note 33, at 350.
76 Breyer, supra note 33, at 267 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 266.
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judicial system. Injustice Blackmun's words, U.S. courts must look beyond narrow U.S. inter-
ests to the "mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal
regime" and, whenever possible, should "consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than
impedes, the development of an ordered international system.""8
The nationalistjustices reject the transnationalist views on the ground that comparative
and international analysis is appropriate only to legislative and constitutional drafting, not to
the task ofjudicial constitutional interpretation.V Yet on reflection, this distinction makes no
sense. The U.S. Constitution served as a principal inspiration and model for many foreign and
international constitutions and covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. There remains to this day a "vigorous overseas trade in the Bill of Rights,
in international and constitutional litigation involving norms derived from American consti-
tutional law."80 Concepts like liberty, equality, and privacy are not exclusively American con-
stitutional ideas but, rather, part and parcel of the global human rights movement. Nor is the
United States the world's only civilized society. By their nature, human rights concepts evolve
and " U] udges in different countries increasingly apply somewhat similar legal phrases to some-
what similar circumstances."s" Construing U.S. constitutional law by referring to other nations'
constitutional drafters, but not their constitutional interpreters, would be akin to operating
a building by examining the blueprints of others on which it was modeled, while ignoring all
subsequent progress reports on howwell those other buildings actually functioned over time.2
In Lawrence itself, justice Scalia argued that Bowers "never relied on 'values we share with a
wider civilization,'.... but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such
a right was not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' "3 Hejustified Bowers
in part because "sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws
of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights."8 4 But to state the argument that
way is to refute it. For, asJustice Scalia earlier conceded, "[t] he Court is quite right that 'his-
tory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substan-
tive due process inquiry.' "85 Early American law punished notjust consensual sodomy, but also
idolatry, blasphemy, adultery, and witchcraft, all of which were treated as capital crimes.8 6
In looking to foreign law, the Lawrence Court simply made two obvious comparisons: first, that
the right asserted by petitioners had long been accepted as fundamental in other countries;
and second, that the State of Texas had demonstrated no more compelling, "legitimate or
urgent" state interest in restricting that right than had been demonstrated in any of these
sister countries.8 7 What sense does it make to construe evolving, universally recognized constitu-
tional concepts such as "due process" and privacy solely in light of national historical tradition,
71 Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 567 (1987)
(Blackmun,J., concurring in part).
79 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,921 n. 11 (1997); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002)
(Thomas,J, concurring in the denial of certiorari) (foreign law and practice may be relevant to legislative drafting).
80 Lester, supra note 46, at 541.
81 Breyer, supra note 33, at 266.
82 Thus, Professor Ramsey concedes that courts worldwide are engaged in a common exercise of interpreting
common legal texts such as the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Warsaw Convention
on air transport liability, while curiously insisting that courts construing various human rights instruments that share
a common heritage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interpreting "different documents, written
in different times and different countries (and sometimes different languages)." Ramsey, supra note 12, at 73.
" Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2494 (Scalia,J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
s4 Id. at 2492.
s Id. at 2492 n.3.
Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOcIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 3 (Laura Randa ed., 1997).
87 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.
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while ignoring strong, contemporary indicia from kindred nations that, in fact, such criminal
laws serve slight governmental interests and infringe concepts of personhood that were not
fully recognized two centuries ago?"'
Nationalist academics add a second objection, which one dubs the "international counter-
majoritarian difficulty": the claim that U.S. constitutional protections that are responsive to
"national consensus giving expression to the sovereign will of the American people" cannot
"be interpreted to give expression to the international majoritarian impulse to protect the
individual from democratic governance."' Yet this argument assumes that thejob ofjudges
construing the Constitution is to give expression to majoritarian impulses, when their long-
settled role (which, of course, gives rise to the domesticcountermajoritarian difficulty) has been
to apply enduring principles of law to evolving circumstance without regard to the will of shift-
ing democratic majorities.90 In effect, the nationalists claim that unelected federaljudges may
not interpret the Constitution by applying rules made by foreign governments or the world
community at the expense of state prerogatives. But obviously, every court in the United
States applies law that was not made by its own polity-including foreign law-whenever the
court's own choice of law principles so direct.
Nor is there anything necessarily antidemocratic about construing U.S. constitutional law
in light of transnational law. As Justice Breyer recently noted:
[T] he transnational law that is being created is not simply a product of treaty-writers,
legislatures, or courts. We in America know full well that in a democracy, law, perhaps most
law, is not decreed from on high but bubbles up from the interested publics, affected
groups, specialists, legislatures, and others, all interacting through meetings, journal
articles, the popular press, legislative hearings, and in many other ways. That is the demo-
craticprocess in action. Legislation typically comes long after this process has been under-
way.Judicial decisions, particularly from our Court, work best when they come last, after
experience has made the consequences of legislation apparent."
WhatJustice Breyer describes is what I have elsewhere called "transnational legal process,"
the process whereby domestic systems incorporate international rules into domestic law
through a three-part process of interaction, interpretation, and norm internalization.92 Virtually
As Justice Kennedy noted in Lawrence:
[A] Imost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered [Dudgeon,]
a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's case.... [and] held that the laws proscribing the conduct were
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeonv. UnitedKingdom 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)
P52. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations
now), the [Dudgeon] decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put Jorward was insubstantial in our
Western civilization.
123 S.Ct. at 2481 (emphasis added).
0 Aford, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 785-86. In fact, the very label "international majoritarian" is misleading.
For U.S. courts are not deferring to the will of the majority of the world's peoples instead of deferring to American
will; rather, our courts are looking to foreign practice for additional evidence of modern standards of decency in a
civilized society. See, e.g., State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003). Significantly, neither Professors Alford
nor Ramsey takes the hard-edged position espoused by nationalistJustices Scalia and Thomas in some recent opin-
ions: namely, that international and foreign law precedents are never relevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation,
a view that those Justices have sometimes ignored in practice. See cases cited supra notes 27, 31.
"Justice Kennedy made the point eloquently in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later gener-
ations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
"' Breyer, supra note 33, at 268 (emphasis added).
12 For elaboration of this point, see Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human RightsLawEnforced? 74 IND.
LJ]. 1397 (1999); and Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
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all legal systems identify one or more mechanisms through which executive, legislative, and
judicial institutions may domesticate international norms, with judicial interpretation of
domestic constitutions representing only one such channel.93 Through a time-honored dia-
logic process, litigants, activists, publicists, and academic commentators seek to inform,
influence, and improve this kind ofjudicial decision making. There is nothing antidemocratic
about academics, nongovernmental organizations,judges, executive officials, Congress, and
foreign governments interacting in a variety of private and public, domestic and interna-
tional fora to make, interpret, internalize, and ultimately enforce rules of transnational law.
To the contrary, it is precisely through this transnational legal process that interlinked rules
of domestic and international law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and
international compliance come about.
In this transnational legal process, the several states, foreign governments, and international
bodies do not represent competing sovereigns, all vying for the right to control America'sjudi-
cial destiny. Rather, a transnationalistjurisprudence suggests, the United States expresses
its national sovereignty not by blocking out all foreign influence but by vigorous "participation
in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system."94 The nationalists'
suggestion that U.S. courts should disregard the rest of the civilized world by ignoring paral-
lel foreign precedents only invites charges of parochialism, and undermines U.S. influence
over the global development of human rights.
Nationalist academics charge that American human rights advocates have used interna-
tional and foreign legal materials selectively; in one commentator's words, refusing to "take
the bitter with the sweet,"95 or in another's view, proposing "international sources ... for
comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing."9 6 Bizarrely, these scholars assume
that United Statesjudges should construe a national bill of rights that the framers thought
was the model for the world in light of the world's worst practices. What this claim misun-
derstands is that those who advocate the use of international and foreign sources in U.S.
constitutional interpretation are not urging U.S. courts to defer automatically to some kind
of global "nose count." Instead, they are suggesting that the practices of other mature democ-
racies-not those that lag behind developmentally-constitute the most relevant evidence
of what Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence calls the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."
97
My point is simple: those who advocate the use of international law in U.S. constitutional
interpretation are not mere "international majoritarians" who believe thatAmerican consti-
tutional liberties should be determined by a worldwide vote. Rather, transnationalists suggest
that particular provisions of our Constitution should be construed with decent respect for
international and foreign comparative law. When phrases like "due process of law," "equal
protection," and "cruel and unusual punishments" are illuminated by parallel rules, empir-
ical evidence, or community standards found in other mature legal systems, that evidence
should not simply be ignored. Wise American judges did not do so at the beginning of the
Republic, and there is no warrant for them to start now.
In any event, Lautrence and Atkins may signal that the nationalists' heyday has finally passed.
AsJustice Breyer recently noted, "By now.., it should be clear that the chicken has broken
'2 For a discussion of the appropriate relationship between domestic and international tribunal rulings, see
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 ASIL PROC. 45 (2002).
94 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGN'Y: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORYAGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
15 Ramsey, supra note 12, at 76-77.
9" Alford, Misusing Sources, supra note 12, at 67.
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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out of the egg."98 Like it or not, both foreign and international law are already part of our
law. In time, I expect, those who continue to deny that reality will be remembered like those
who "assumed the attitude once ascribed.., to the British: when told how things are done
in another country they simply say 'How funny.' ,
MISUSING INTERNATIONAL SOURCES TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
By Roger P. Alford*
In the keynote address to the 2003 annual meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law,Justice Stephen Breyer declared that "comparative analysis emphatically is relevant
to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights."' Justice Breyer con-
cluded that nothing could be "more exciting for an academic, practitioner, orjudge than the
global legal enterprise that is now upon us."2 In a room filled with international lawyers and
academics, he received a home court standing ovation.
I would hazard that the wider legal academy would not have receivedJustice Breyer's speech
with nearly the same enthusiasm, just as it will not warmly embrace the "remarkable" and
"quite extraordinary"' appeal to international sources4 that is evident in recent Supreme Court
decisions.' For if we acceptJustice Breyer's incipient constitutional comparativism, conced-
ing thatjudges everywhere face the "same kinds of problems ... armed with the same kinds
of legal instruments,"6 then we accept a potential "change [to] the course of American law"7
through expansion of the traditional "canon of authoritative materials from which constitu-
tional common law reasoning might go forward."8 That canon has traditionally been viewed
as encompassing text, structure, history, and national experience.9 Including a new source
" Breyer, supra note 33, at 267.
"James Michael, Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 NEW L.J. 831, 831 (1988).
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Earlier versions of these comments were pre-
sented at the 2002 annual conference of the American Society ofInternational Law, Section on International Law
in Domestic Courts, Fordham University Law School; and the 2003 International Law Society-West symposium at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the comments of the participants at those conferences,
as well as the research assistance of David Dae Hoon Kim, Georgetown University Law Center.
' Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 ASIL PROC. 265, 265 (2003) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah
Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture
(Feb. 11, 1999), in 21 CARDozo L. REV. 253, 282 (1999)).
2 Id. at 268.
5 Peter Rubin, American Constitution Society Supreme Court Roundup (July 1, 2003), at <http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/
SCOTUStrans.pdf> (describing references to European Court of Human Rights in Supreme Court's Lawrence
decision as "remarkable" and "quite extraordinary"); see also Inferior Imports, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY,July 10, 2003,
atA15 (discussing "disturbing" approach in Lawrenceof using foreign courts to interpret Constitution); Tony Mauro,
Supreme Court Opening up to World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES,July 7, 2003, at 1, 8 (this year was "breakthrough term" in
which "the ostrich's head came out of the sand"). For a particularly sharp critique, see ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING
VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 15-25, 135-39 (2003) (discussing "insidious appeal of internationalism"
in constitutional interpretation).
1 use the term "international sources" in order to include the full panoply of transnational comparative mate-
rials that may be borrowed in the interpretive process, including international and foreign laws and practices.
5 For a discussion of these cases, see text at notes 21-24, 40-41, 58-61 infra.
' Stephen Breyer, R6flexions relatives au principe de fraternit6, Address to the 30th Congress of the Association
of French-Speaking Constitutional Courts (June 20, 2003), at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_06-20-03.html> ("En un mot on trouve partout desjuges faisant face aux mmes esphces de problimes
et armts des mhmes esphces d'instrumentsjuridiques.").
7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 203 (2003) (discussing potential
change resulting from cross-fertilization).
' Charles Fried, Scholars andjudges, Reason and Power, 23 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y807, 819 (2000) (discussingJustice
Breyer's proposal to use comparative materials in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
9 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORYOFTHE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 (2000).
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